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A BETTER INTERPRETATION OF THE
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
Dennis M. Doiron*
INTRODUCTION
A viable fetus is not a person under the wrongful death act, de-
clared the Maine Law Court in a controversial decision in 1988.1 To
reach this conclusion, the court employed one traditional and one
new rule of statutory interpretation, and one traditional rule of law.
The traditional rule of interpretation-that the wrongful death act
is to be strictly construed because it is in derogation of the common
law-dates from the earliest wrongful death cases heard by the
court.2 The new rule of interpretation-that the death statute must
be harmonized with the Maine Uniform Probate Code 3-derives
from the enactment of the Code in 1981 and the placement of the
wrongful death statute within it. The traditional rule of law-that
recovery for wrongful death is exclusively governed by the terms of
the wrongful death statute-is related to the rule of strict construc-
tion, but is based specifically on a mid-nineteenth century case" that
held the common law did not allow recovery for wrongful death. The
Law Court has consistently held since then that the common law in
Maine does not allow recovery for wrongful death, and, therefore,
that the statute provides the sole basis for recovery."
This Article argues that all three rules should be discarded. The
rule of strict construction for statutes in derogation of the common
law should be rejected because the dominant nineteenth century ju-
dicial understanding of the role played by legislative enactments
within the body of the law and of the role of the courts as "appli-
* J.D., University of Maine School of Law, 1990. The author dedicates this Article
to Active Retired Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Sidney W. Wer-
nick-student and teacher of the legal process.
1. Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988). See infra notes 71-81
and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. See generally Note, Milton .
Cary Medical Center: A Viable Fetus Is Not A Person Under Maine's Wrongful
Death Statute, 41 MAINE I Rxv. 429 (1989).
2. See infra notes Section I(C). Although the Milton court did not specifically
state that the statute would be strictly construed, it noted that the statute "'is to be
limited to cases clearly within the terms of the act"' because the act " 'created a
liability unknown to the common law ....' Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 538 A.2d
at 254 (quoting Hammond v. Lewiston, Augusta and Waterville St. Ry., 106 Me. 209,
212-13, 76 A. 672, 673 (1909)). This language is the traditional formulation of the rule
of strict construction and Hammond is one of the earliest wrongful death cases to
employ the rule.
3. See Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 538 A.2d at 255.
4. Nickerson v. Harriman, 38 Me. 277, 279-80 (1854). See infra notes 32 & 104
and accompanying text.
5. Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 538 A.2d at 253 n.2, 254.
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ers," not makers, of the law is no longer vital. The Law Court's con-
temporary understanding of the importance of legislative enact-
ments and its greater appreciation of its creative role in the judicial
decision-making process require a reappraisal of the rule of strict
construction. Moreover, the rule of strict construction, as specifi-
cally applied to the wrongful death act, is no longer appropriate be-
cause contemporary common law principles overwhelmingly support
recovery for wrongful death.7 Finally, no new justifications have
arisen to support the continued use of the rule.8
The recently introduced rule of interpreting the wrongful death
act by looking primarily, if not solely, to the terms and provisions of
the Uniform Probate Code should be discarded because there is
neither legislative support nor sound interpretive reasons for such a
requirement. Milton v. Cary Medical Center," which announced this
rule, involved the difficult issue of when a fetus becomes a legal per-
son for purposes of the death act. This difficult legal question was
decided, moreover, within the context of the emotional public de-
bate on abortion rights and fetal protection.1" As such it was both a
"great" and "hard" case, which, true to form, created bad law." As
bad law in turn creates hard cases, 2 the reach of this bad law should
be limited by the Law Court.
6. See infra Section II(C).
7. See infra Section II(B).
8. See infra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
9. 538 A.2d at 252.
10. The possible connection between Milton and the abortion issue is evidenced
by the near passage of L.D. 551 (114th Legis. 1989), "An Act to Allow Recovery for
Wrongful Death of Unborn Children," which was originally written by the Maine
Right to Life Committee following Milton. See Legis. Rec. H-995 (lst Reg. Sess.
1989) (remarks of Rep. Clark) ("Make no mistake about this bill, this bill was pro-
posed and is supported by the Maine Right to Life Committee."). The bill was passed
by the Legislature but vetoed by the Governor. See Governor's Veto Message, Legis.
Rec. H-1146 (1st Reg. Sess. 1989) ("Because the bill confers a legal personality on a
fetus for purposes of wrongful death actions, it greatly expands the opportunities for
applying this legal status to other circumstances.").
11. Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the fu-
ture, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest
which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate
interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously
was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of
law will bend.
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-401 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
12. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 398 (1950) (A
response to the particular controversy is "dangerous" because "it leads readily to
finding an out for this case only-and that leads to a complicating multiplicity of
refinement and distinction .... This is what the proverb seeks to say: 'Hard cases
make bad law.' ").
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Finally, the rule of law that the wrongful death statute, by its
terms alone, governs any and all state wrongful death claims must
bend, in compelling circumstances, in recognition of both the his-
toric and, more importantly, contemporary legal principles which
ground the recovery for wrongful death in the common law. The
Law Court, furthermore, should recognize that the Legislature did
not preempt the field of wrongful death law by the passage of the
wrongful death act in 1891, but rather enacted the legislation merely
to narrow the reach of the harsh judicially created rule that had de-
nied recovery altogether.
Instead of the three rules above, the Law Court should adopt a
rule of "fair construction," one which involves the court in a purpo-
sive analysis of the terms and provisions of the act without the pre-
sumption against coverage or application in the doubtful case that is
at the heart of the rule of strict construction and without the fiction,
integral to the rule, that any statutory terms are so "clear and un-
ambiguous" that interpretation is unnecessary. In addition, instead
of looking to the Probate Code as the sole source for divining the
meaning of terms of the wrongful death statute, the court should use
the Probate Code as only one source for particular questions of in-
terpretation. Maine courts should be free to examine and adopt
principles from other areas of law even if, in doing so, the act would
be interpreted inconsistently with the Probate Code. Because
wrongful death is fundamentally a tort action, tort law should espe-
cially be consulted.
Finally, by recognizing the vital contemporary common law
sources that support a common law wrongful death action and,
thereby, allowing the terms of the statutory action to be supple-
mented or extended by the common law beyond what the honestly
interpreted terms of the wrongful death statute would bear, the
courts would be freer to do justice in otherwise nonactionable but
compelling circumstances. By recognizing a common law power to
create wrongful death law supplementally through the common law
process, rather than creating law only interstitially by the process of
interpretation, the court could achieve justice in the particular cir-
cumstance without impinging on the legislative prerogative through
the use of interpretive subterfuges.1 3
All three changes in the interpretation of the statute would allow
the Law Court to better fit the law of wrongful death to the "fabric
of the law" by allowing courts to more nearly meet the traditional
Anglo-American jurisprudential goal of treating "like cases alike.""
The "statutorification"'15 of the law since the turn of the century
13. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172-77 (1982).
14. Id. at 97.
15. Id. at 1-3. See also G. GImOR THE AGES OF AMEMCAN LAw 95 (1977) (mod-
em period as "orgy of statute making").
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and, especially from the period of the New Deal, interfered with this
effort and created a fundamental challenge for twentieth century
courts-the task of unifying statutory and common law into a coher-
ent whole. In the 1930's, Justice Harlan Stone wrote that the "better
organization of judge-made and statute law into a coordinated sys-
tem is one of the major problems of common law."1 According to
the influential legal theorists Henry Hart and Albert Sacks,17 an im-
portant component of the judicial task of statutory interpretation is
to place statutes into a dynamic, coherent legal system.'8
Ironically, the original purpose in early English law for the rule of
strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law was
to interpret the infrequent legislative enactment in a manner consis-
tent with the body of existing, primarily judge-made law;' 9 but the
16. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4,15 (1936).
17. "In a deep sense we are all followers of Henry Hart and know the moves (of
purpose analysis] almost by instinct." G. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 87.
18. "The purpose of a statute must always be treated as including not only an
immediate purpose or group of related purposes but a larger and more subtle purpose
as to how the particular statute is to be fitted into the legal system as a whole." H.
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICA-
TION OF LAW 1414 (tent. ed. 1958). See also Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpre-
tation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 35 (1988) ("Hart and Sacks attempt to show how the
process of adjudication imposes on the decision maker a duty to understand the stat-
ute in its broader legal and social context."); DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986).
For an example of how the Maine Law Court has interpreted statutory provisions
with a concern for creating a coherent body of related law, see McKellar v. Clark
Equipment Co., 472 A.2d 411, 415 (Me. 1984) (allowing wife's civil claim for loss of
consortium for injuries sustained by husband covered under the workers compensa-
tion statute "would lead to anomalous results when applied to the broad range of
industrial injuries.").
19. The rule was first announced in England during a time when statutes were few
and the body of the law was primarily judge made. See Bruncken, The Common Law
and Statutes, 29 YALE L.J. 516, 519 (1920).
In days when there was but little legislation, especially in the domain of
private law, . . . a maxim grew up and became a legal commonplace, ac-
cording to which "acts in derogation of the common law are to be construed
strictly." In this abstract form, the maxim is hardly an accurate statement
of the law as laid down in the decisions. An early and more precise enuncia-
tion is found in a case arising as long ago as the time of Queen Anne: "Stat-
utes are not presumed to make any alteration in the common law, further
or otherwise than the act does expressly declare." [Arthur v. Bokenham,
(1708, Eng. C. P.) 11 Mod. 148, 150.] And a little further on the court
continues:
"Therefore in doubtful cases we may enlarge the construction of
acts of Parliament according to the reason and sense of the law-
makers, expressed in other parts of the act, or guessed, by consid-
ering the frame and design of the whole. [Id. at 161.]"
Id. Bruncken noted the salutary effect of the rule, rightly used, to integrate statutes
with the overarching legal context, but also noted the modern tendency in America to
distort the rule by limiting the reach of modern statutes beyond that favored by the
courts. Id. at 521. It is the latter distortion of the rule which Bruncken and Pound
found objectionable. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383
[Vol. 43:449
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rule was later distorted to its present shape in the nineteenth
century.2"
Today, instead of only harmonizing statutes with the common
law, the courts, through both interpretive and creative law-making,
should seek to unify the body of law by looking to legal principles
that have their sources in both the common law and statutory law.
The Maine Law Court adopted this general approach to both statu-
tory interpretation and common law decisionmaking in numerous
cases during the 1980's.21
The goal of interpreting statutes and developing the common law
in a manner that promotes unity has been described figuratively as a
task for Hercules 22 and, ultimately, is perhaps unachievable.2 If
Hercules is not a realistic model, the Law Court should at least look
to Hippocrates and adopt as a modest first principle of interpreta-
tion the injunction to do no harm. The current three rules of inter-
pretation used by the court for the wrongful death act do not meet
this modest first rule. The methods recommended by this Article do
not guarantee that the law of wrongful death will develop in coher-
ence with other areas of law in Maine, but they do at least clear the
legal litter, from both the distant and recent past, which currently
obstructs the path to that goal.
I BACKGROUND
A. The Rule of Baker v. Bolton
In 1808, a widower brought suit in an English trial court seeking
damages from the owners of a stagecoach which had overturned and
fatally injured his wife, a passenger. The complaint asserted that the
plaintiff had "wholly lost and been deprived of the comfort, fellow-
ship, and assistance of his said wife, and had from thence hitherto
suffered and undergone great grief, vexation, and anguish of
mind."2" The trial justice, Lord Ellenborough, instructed the jury
that recovery would be allowed only for loss of services and grief
suffered by the plaintiff from the time of injury to the time of death.
Then, in dictum, Lord Ellenborough announced what would become
known, and widely accepted, as the rule of Baker v. Bolton: "[I]n a
civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of
as an injury."" Lord Elenborough offered no source of authority for
(1908).
20. See infra Section I(C).
21. See infra note 129.
22. P, DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 337-48.
23. G. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 99-100.
24. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808) (nisi prius).
25. Id. at 493. See generally, 1 S. SPEIsaR, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFuL DATH § 1:1
(2d ed. 1975).
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this holding, there apparently being none,2" but this dictum would
later prove to have tremendous persuasive force on both sides of the
Atlantic.
For forty years not a word was written about the dictum of Lord
Ellenborough. Then, in 1848, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, in a highly influential decision, adopted the rule of Baker v.
Bolton. In Carey v. Berkshire Railroad Co.,2 ' the court denied relief
in a wrongful death action to the widow of a railroad employee
killed through the alleged negligence of his employer. The court,
without discussion, and with no more authority in American case
law than Lord Ellenborough had in English case law,28 simply
adopted the rule of Baker v. Bolton.29 Carey, in turn, was cited as a
source of authority by the United States Supreme Court" and other
states3l that adopted the rule.
In 1854, the Maine Law Court first adopted the rule of Baker v.
Bolton, also using Carey for supporting authority, when it denied a
plaintiff damages for loss of services of a minor son who had died
while employed by the defendant on an ocean-going vessel. In Nick-
erson v. Harriman,'2 the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant
negligently caused the death of the son but simply that the son had
died while illegally working for the defendant. Referring to Baker,
the court stated: "If, when death is the direct and immediate conse-
quence of a wrongful or negligent act, compensation is not recover-
able, still less can it be, when at the most, it is but an indirect or
remote and uncertain result. ' '33 Six years later, the Law Court
squarely denied wrongful death damages for a widow who alleged
that the defendant negligently caused 'the death of her husband. In
Lyons v. Woodward,'3 the court simply stated, while looking to
Nickerson and Carey as authority, that "[a]t common law, no cause
26. Malone, Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1052-62 (1965).
27. 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848).
28. Malone, supra note 26, at 1067.
29. 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) at 478. Curiously, Carey was the first court in either the
United States or England to endorse the rule in Baker. In fact, Carey itself was cited
as authority in the first appellate court decision in England that adopted the rule of
Baker v. Bolton. See Osborn v. Gillet, 8 L.R.-Ex. 88, 97 (1873). See generally, Ma-
lone, supra note 26, at 1059.
30. In 1986, in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), the United States Supreme
Court adopted the rule of Baker v. Bolton to deny a wrongful death action under
federal general maritime law. The Supreme Court continued to follow the rule of
Baker v. Bolton in subsequent maritime cases for almost a century until it undertook
an exhaustive review of the law of wrongful death in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
398 U.S. 375 (1970). See infra notes 113-129 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Moragne decision.
31. Malone, supra note 26, at 1067; S. SPEISER, supra note 25, at § 1:1.
32. 38 Me. 277 (1854).
33. Id. at 280.
34. 49 Me. 29 (1860).
[Vol. 43:449
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of action accrues to the plaintiff to recover damages for the injury
[caused by the wrongful act]. ' 5 The Law Court has never waivered
from its belief that recovery for wrongful death is unknown to the
common law. After passage of the wrongful death act in 1891, the
court used the rule of Baker v. Bolton as the basis for strictly con-
struing the death statute and for denying recovery beyond its terms.
B. Statutory Enactments
In 1891, the Maine Legislature abrogated the rule of Baker v. Bol-
ton by passing a statute, modeled after Lord Campbell's Act in Eng-
land,36 that for the first time provided a general civil remedy for
wrongful death.3 7 The statute provided pecuniary damages of up to
five thousand dollars to the widow, children, or heirs of a person
who had been killed by the "wrongful act, neglect or default" of
another.38
Since its passage in 1891, the wrongful death act has been
amended on several occasions but remains substantially unchanged.
The amendments to the act have most often served to increase the
amount and type of damages allowed or to change the description of
the class of beneficiaries. The first amendment inserted the word
"widower" as a member of the beneficiary class.30 In 1933, the cap
on pecuniary damages was raised for the first time from $5,000 to
$10,000.40 In 1939, damages for recovery by the estate for medical,
surgical and hospital care and treatment were allowed under the
death action.4 In 1943, the cost of funeral expenses was included as
a recovery for the estate.4 2 Also in 1943, the Legislature addressed
the problem raised by a series of court cases which had held, with a
few exceptions, that the death action could not be brought where
the decedent had not died immediately from the injuries sus-
35. Id. at 29-30.
36. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93.
37. In 1848 the Legislature enacted a limited wrongful death action for the heirs
of decedents killed "through ignorance or gross neglect" on the part of steamship or
locomotive employees. Recovery was effected "by indictment," i.e., by an action
brought by the state, and damages were paid to the executor of the estate for the
benefit of the heirs of the deceased. R.S. ch. 70 (1848) (approved August 10, 1848).
Earlier a similar recovery had been allowed by an 1821 statute for heirs of decedents
killed as a result of defective highways. R.S. ch. 118, § 17 (1822). See generally An-
derson v. Wetter, 103 Me. 257, 267 (1899).
38. R-S. ch. 89 §§ 9 & 10 (1903).
39. P.L. 1929, ch. 1.
40. P.L. 1933, ch. 113. The cap would later be raised to $20,000, P.L. 1957, ch. 183
(effective August 28, 1957), then $30,000, P.L. 1961, ch. 315 (effective September 16,
1961), and then eliminated altogether in 1965, thereby allowing the jury to determine
"fair and just compensation" without a statutorily defined upper limit. P.L. 1965. ch.
255.
41. P.L. 1939, ch. 252.
42. P.L. 1943, ch. 227.
1991]
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tained .4s The amendment specifically established that, where the de-
cedent died after conscious suffering, the estate could bring an ac-
tion for the conscious suffering in addition to the recovery already
available." In 1967, the act was revised to allow parents of a minor
child to recover $5,000 for loss of comfort, society and
companionship."
In 1977, the death statute was substantially rewritten to clarify
the content of the action, to allow $10,000 in damages for the loss of
comfort, society and companionship of the deceased person, and to
specify the distribution of settlements achieved without trial.40 A
1979 amendment provided that wrongful death claims against gov-
ernmental entities were limited under the terms of the recently en-
acted Maine Tort Claims Act.47
A major revision, and one that would have a substantial effect on
the interpretation of the death statute, occurred in 1981 when the
wrongful death statute was repealed, rewritten with only minor sub-
stantive change,"4 and placed within the simultaneously enacted
Maine Uniform Probate Code.4 9
43. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
44. P.L. 1943, ch. 346. The wrongful death act, as amended, was contained in R.S.
ch. 152 §§ 9-11 (1944), and was later moved to R.S. ch. 165, §§ 9-11 (1954).
45. P.L. 1967, ch. 369. The cap on recovery was later raised to $10,000 in 1969.
P.L. 1969, ch. 266.
46. P.L. 1977, ch. 192 and 564.
47. P.L. 1979, ch. 68, § 2 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2552 (Supp.
1979-1980)).
48. The only substantive change in the revision was the addition of the modifier
"minor" to "children" in the description of the beneficiary class in § 2-804(b), for-
merly § 2552. The legislative record is silent on the reason for this change.
49. P.L. 1979, ch. 540 (effective Jan. 1, 1981). The new wrongful death statute,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (1981) provides in its entirety:
(a) Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neg-
lect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had
not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and re-
cover damages in respect thereof, then the person or the corporation that
would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable for damages
as provided in this section, notwithstanding the death of the person injured
and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
shall amount to a felony.
(b) Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal
representative of the deceased person, and the amount recovered in every
such action, except as otherwise provided, shall be for the exclusive benefit
of the surviving spouse, if no minor children, and of the children if no sur-
viving spouse, and one-half for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse
and one-half for the exclusive benefit of the minor children to be divided
equally among them, if there are both surviving spouse and minor children,
and to the deceased's heirs to be distributed as provided in section 2-106, if
there is neither surviving spouse nor minor children. The jury may give
such damages as it shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference
to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons for whose
benefit the action is brought, and in addition thereto shall give such dam-
[Vol. 43:449
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Since 1981, the act has been amended to raise the cap on damages
for loss of society from $10,000 to $50,0000 and then to $75,000.1
When the cap was raised to $75,000 in 1989, the amendment allowed
damages resulting from "emotional distress arising from the same
facts as those constituting the underlying claim."0 2 The amendment
also included damages for loss of comfort, society and companion-
ship, in addition to damages for emotional distress. 3
C. A Century of Interpretation
After Maine enacted the wrongful death statute, the Maine Law
ages as will compensate the estate of the deceased person for reasonable
expenses of medical, surgical and hospital care and treatment and for rea-
sonable funeral expenses, and in addition thereto may give damages not
exceeding $10,000 for the loss of comfort, society and companionship of the
deceased to the persons for whose benefit the action is brought, provided
that the action shall be commenced within 2 years after the decedents
death. If a claim under this section is settled without an action having been
commenced, the amount paid in settlement shall be distributed as provided
in this subsection. No settlement on behalf of minor children shall be valid
unless approved by the court, as provided in Title 14, section 1605.
(c) Whenever death ensues following a period of conscious suffering, as a
result of personal injuries due to the wrongful act, neglect or default of any
person, the person who caused the personal injuries resulting in such con-
scious suffering and death shall, in addition to the action at common law
and damages recoverable therein, be liable in damages in a separate count
in the same action for such death, brought, commenced and determined
and subject to the same limitation as to the amount recoverable for such
death and exclusively for the beneficiaries in the manner set forth in sub-
section (b), separately found, but in such cases there shall be only one re-
covery for the same injury.
(d) Any action under this section brought against a governmental entity
under Title 14, sections 8101 to 8118, shall be limited as provided in those
sections.
The following official comment was added to the rewritten act:
"General. This section was added to the Uniform Probate Code version in order to
preserve and integrate prior Maine law concerning wrongful death actions." The only
substantive change in the revision of the former § 2552 was the addition of the modi-
fier "minor" to "children." The legislative record is silent on the reasons for this
change.
The legislative history of the wrongful death act's incorporation into the Probate
Code and the effect on interpretation of the statute is fully discussed in this Article.
See infra section TH(a) and note 97.
50. P.L. 1981, ch. 213.
51. P.L. 1989, ch. 340.
52. Id. The 1989 amendment was in response to Purty v. Kennebec Valley Medi-
cal Center, 551 A.2d 858 (1988) which held that claims for emotional distress to a
beneficiary arising from the death of the decedent could be brought under a cause of
action separate from the wrongful death action. See LD. 795, Statement of Fact
(114th Legis. 1989), "An Act to Amend the Wrongful Death Act to Encompas3 Ass-
ciated Claims."
53. P.L. 1989, ch. 340.
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Court, like most courts in other jurisdictions," applied a rule of
strict construction because the statute was supposedly in derogation
of the common law. As applied by the Law Court for the past cen-
tury, the rule has been used both as a restraint on the court's law-
creating powers to extend the functional purposes of the statute be-
yond the terms of the statute and as a limitation on the court's in-
terpretation of the statute.
In an early case, Hammond v. Street Railway,5 the court, in hold-
ing that the wrongful death statute must be construed strictly,
stated that because the statute created "a liability unknown to the
common law, [its] effect is to be limited to cases clearly within the
terms of the act. No right of action is to be inferred and no remedy
is to be given except as specified in the statute." 8 The court fol-
lowed the "'general principle of construction that where a right is
given by statute and a remedy provided in the same act, the right
can be pursued in no other mode.' -57 The Hammond court also in-
dicated the close relationship between the rule of strict construction
and a rule of plain meaning. "The construction contended for by the
plaintiff wrenches too violently the plain language of the statute,
while that adopted follows its natural and reasonable meaning."' s As
recently as 1988, the court reiterated the rule of strict construction
as the proper method of interpretation: "The wrongful death act
created a right of action where none may have existed at common
law. Statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
54. See S. SPEISER, supra note 25, at § 1:12.
55. 106 Me. 209, 76 A. 672 (1909).
56. Id. at 212-13, 76 A. at 673. The issue faced by the Hammond court was
whether beneficiaries under the wrongful death act were only those who were benefi-
ciaries at the time of the death, or whether beneficiaries also included those who fit
the terms of the statute at the time suit was entered for recovery under the act. Id. at
211, 76 A. at 672. See also McKay v. New England Dredging Co., 92 Me. 454, 458, 43
A. 29 (1899). "The right to any compensation is wholly created by the statute, and
the amount of the compensation is to be measured solely by the standard prescribed
by the statute. At common law in cases like this there was no right of action in the
widow, children or heirs for any compensation.. . . The statute is to be construed as
a new statute, creating a new right, and not as affirming or reviving an ancient right."
Id. at 458, 43 A. at 29.
57. Hammond v. Street Railway, 106 Me. at 213, 76 A. at 673 (quoting Flatley v.
Memphis & Charleston R. R. Co., 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 230, 234 (1872); Loague v. R. R.
Co. 91 Tenn. 458, 19 S.W. 430 (1892)).
58. Id. at 216, 76 A. at 674. See also id. at 213, 76 A. at 673 ("The language of the
statute under consideration is plain and unambiguous."); Chase v. Town of Litchfield,
134 Me. 122, 129, 182 A. 921, 925 (1936) ("the common law is not to be changed by
doubtful implication, be overturned except by clear and unambiguous language and
... a statute in derogation of it will not effect a change thereof beyond that clearly
indicated either by express terms or by necessary implication"). But see Mundy v.
Simmons, 424 A.2d 135, 137 (Me. 1980) (while "plain meaning" of wrongful death
statute will generally control, the fundamental rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain real purpose and intent of the Legislature).
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construed."89
Although the Law Court has generally applied the rule of strict
construction to the death statute throughout the past century, 0 the
court has not been consistent in doing so. In Sawyer v. Perry,"' the
Law Court held that an action for wrongful death did not lie where
the decedent had lived for an hour after the injury causing death.
The court reasoned that to allow recovery under the wrongful death
act would make the tortfeasor liable for damages under both the
survival and wrongful death statutes. 2 The court based this limita-
tion not on the explicit language contained in the statute itself,
which said nothing about immediate death, but on the presumed in-
tention of the Legislature when the act was passed in 1891.0 The
court did not derive the intent of the Legislature from an examina-
tion of the legislative history of the act, but from an earlier Law
Court decision which had interpreted the limited, predecessor
wrongful death action for the heirs of passengers killed on rail-
roads." The court stated that "[pirevious statutes of a similar char-
59. Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1020 (Me. 1988) (citations omitted).
60. The canon of strict construction has generally been employed to help resolve
questions relating to elements of damages allowed under the act. See Miller v.
Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1020 (Me. 1988) (emotional distress not an element of dam-
ages); Carrier v. Bornstein, 136 Me. 1, 2-3, 1 A.2d 219, 220 (1938) ("Eentimental
hurts" not element of damages); McKay v. New England Dredging Co., 92 Me. 454,
458, 43 A. 29 (1899) (no punitive damages; damages for suffering by the decedent;
grief, distress of mind, or loss of society to beneficiaries; or damages to the estate
from the injuries of decedent).
The rule has also been applied in other contexts. See Milton v. Cary Medical
Center, 538 A.2d 252, 256 (Me. 1988) (viable fetus not a "person" under the act);
Chase v. Town of Litchfield, 134 Me. 122, 133, 182 A. 921, 927 (1936) ("corporation"
in death act does not include a town acting in its governmental capacity); Danforth v.
Emmons, 124 Me. 156, 158-59, 126 A. 821, 822 (1924) (contributory negligence of a
beneficiary for death of decedent may not reduce damages to beneficiary).
61. 88 Me. 42, 3 A. 660 (1895). For a critical discussion of the court's holding in
Sawyer and subsequent decisions based on that holding, see Wernick, The Maine
Law of Wrongful Death, 5 PEABODY L Rnv. 57 (1940).
62. Sawyer v. Perry, 88 Me. at 47, 33 A. at 661. The fact that the Law Court
interpreted the text both strictly and by looking to legislative intent, depending upon
whether a particular approach would serve to restrict the scope of the act, supports
the view that the Maine Law Court, like most turn of the century common law courts,
was reluctant to give full respect to progressive legislation.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 46-47. In State v. Maine Central R.., 60 Me. 490 (1872), the Law Court
determined that the wrongful death action allowed under R.S. ch. 51, § 36 (heirs of
decedents killed in railroad accidents allowed recovery by indictment), applied only
to cases where the decedent died immediately. The court reached this determination
even though the railroad death act, like the 1891 wrongful death action, did not by its
terms limit the action only to cases where death was immediate. The court deter-
mined that the intent of the Legislature in allowing the action was to remedy those
situations where, because a person died immediately, the survival action allowed
under R.S. ch. 87, § 8 did not accrue. In such a circumstance the heirs had no remedy
under the law. Id. at 491. The court found that to allow both a survival action and
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acter having been so interpreted, we can not resist the conviction
that the legislature expected and intended that this statute should
receive the same interpretation." 65 Therefore, at the very beginning
of the court's interpretation of the act, the court looked to legislative
purposes to discern the meaning of the statute.
In several cases the Law Court interpreted the statute to give it
greater coverage than a rule of strict construction would seem to
otherwise require. For example, in Danforth v. Emmons," the court
determined that the word "widow" included "widower," thereby al-
lowing the widower of the decedent to qualify as a beneficiary. In
Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,67 the court interpreted the act
to allow an action in wrongful death based on liability under the
recently enacted strict products liability act. With minimal discus-
sion, the court concluded that actions which constituted liability
under the strict products liability statute were included within the
phrase "wrongful act, neglect or default" of the wrongful death stat-
ute.6 Although strict products liability was not a recognized cause
of action when the wrongful death act was passed in 1891, the court
allowed the passage of the products liability statute, and its own in-
terpretation of that statute, to determine the meaning of the terms
within the wrongful death act.69 In both these cases the court said
nothing about the canon of strict construction.
Finally, the Law Court has on occasion looked to probate law, es-
pecially the law of intestate succession, as an aid to the interpreta-
the wrongful death action where the decedent had lived for a period of time after the
death causing injury would be an "absurdity." Id. at 492. The court's interpretation
of the statute on this point has been criticized. Wernick, supra note 61, at 65-70, 73.
"To provide a recovery by the dependents for the pecuniary losses to them caused by
wrongful death does not conflict with, nor duplicate, a recovery by the estate under
the survival statute for the decedent's own losses incurred before his death." Id. at
76.
The restrictive view of the railroad statute in State v. Grand Trunk Ry., 61 Me. 114
(1873), on which Sawyer was founded, was not shared by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. Commonwealth v. Metropolitan R.R., 107 Mass. 236, 237 (1871). The
Legislature ultimately changed the wrongful death act to allow recovery under both
the wrongful death act and the survival statute for persons who did not die immedi-
ately from injuries causing the death. P.L. 1943, ch. 346 § 10-A (effective July 9,
1943).
65. Sawyer v. Perry, 88 Me. at 47, 33 A. at 661.
66. 124 Me. 156, 126 A. 821 (1924).
67. 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986).
68. Id. at 540.
69. Id.
By its own terms, section 2-804 is not limited to situations where the
death producing conduct is based on fault. The statute authorizes a cause
of action not only in cases of neglect but also for "wrongful acts." Under
[the products liability act], the manufacturer commits a wrongful act when
he puts a defective or unreasonably dangerous product into the stream of
commerce.
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tion of the death statute. In 1899, the court stated that the parents
of the decedent, as the only living relatives, and, therefore, as the
only heirs of the decedent, were proper beneficiaries under the terms
of the death statute.7 In Milton v. Cary Medical Center,"7 the court
fundamentally altered the use of probate law in its interpretation of
the death statute by relying solely on the provisions of the Probate
Code to determine whether a viable fetus is a "person" under the
statute. This decision is critically discussed in the section below.
For the past century the court has interpreted the wrongful death
statute narrowly on some occasions and expansively on others. Gen-
erally, with the exception of Milton and the cases involving "imme-
diate death" beginning with Sawyer v. Perry, the court's interpreta-
tion of the statute has been sound, if cautious. The major problem
in the court's interpretation of the statute today involves not so
much the rule of strict construction,.for although the rule is unnec-
essary and unhelpful, the court has on occasion shown a willingness
to disregard it. Rather, the excessive reliance on probate law an-
nounced in Milton and the court's unwillingness to extend the gen-
eral principles of the statute beyond its terms present the greatest
obstacles to a fuller development of the law of wrongful death. The
following sections discuss current rules of interpretation and law in
detail and recommend modest changes to the treatment that the
Law Court presently accords the law of wrongful death.
IL A BrR INTE1PRETATION OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH Aar
A. Wrongful Death and the Probate Code
Maine's Uniform Probate Code became effective on January 1,
1981.72 The law was based upon draft statutes prepared by the
Maine Probate Law Revision Commission. The wrongful death act
was included within Maine's Uniform Probate Code as section 2-
804.
The Maine Law Court first interpreted the wrongful death act in
light of its placement within the Uniform Probate Code in 1988. In
Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 7 a sharply divided Law Court inter-
70. McKay v. New England Dredging Co., 92 Me. 454, 458, 43 A. 29, (1899). See
also Carrier v. Bornstein, 136 Me. 1, 2, 1 A. 219 (1938).
71. 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988).
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-101 to § 8.401 (1981 & Supp. 1990). The
Maine Uniform Probate Code generally follows the Uniform Probate Code which w=s
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
by the American Bar Association in 1969. The Maine Uniform Probate Code was
enacted by P.L. 1979, ch. 540 (effective Jan. 1, 1981).
73. See MAiNE PROBATE LAW REVISION COMM'N. Rm_0n" TO THE COWsuISSION. REC-
OMMENDATIONS CONCERNING TE PROBATE CODE AN) CONSTr-rnONAL AENDMEN1'S
(Jan. 24, 1980) and MAINE PROBATE LAw REVISION COM'N. REPORT OF THE Comuts-
SION'S STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING MAINE PROBATE LAw (Oct. 1978).
74. 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988) (4-3 decision).
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preted the word "person" in the wrongful death act as not encom-
passing a viable fetus. In making this decision, the Law Court sub-
stantially relied on the death statute's position within the Uniform
Probate Code.7
The Law Court ultimately framed the issue in Milton as whether
"a viable fetus [could] benefit as a minor child or as an heir under
section 2-106 of the Probate Code from the wrongful death of a par-
ent or antecedent[.]"' Although the Probate Code defines "person"
as "an individual, a corporation, an organization, or other legal en-
tity,"77 the Law Court examined several other provisions of the
Code. The court first looked to section 1-201(24), which defines "mi-
nor" as "a person under 18 years of age."'78 The court then looked
to section 1-201(3), which defines "child" as including "any individ-
ual entitled to take as a child under this Code of intestate succes-
sion. . . .1" The court stated: "There can be no doubt that any ref-
erence to a 'child,' 'heir' or 'issue' in the Probate Code as it relates
to intestate succession can only be construed as meaning a fetus that
is born alive and that survives the decedent by 120 hours."80
The Law Court concluded:
To construe the word "person" in section 2-804(a) to allow an
action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus and not allow benefi-
cial rights or rights of inheritance to a viable fetus for the wrongful
death of a parent or antecedent under section 2-804(b) would be to
create an anomaly. It becomes self-evident that because of the lan-
guage of section 2-804 and its explicit integration into the Probate
Code we must avoid this result in order not to do violence to the
very fabric of the Probate Code.81
After Milton, at least one superior court justice construed the
wrongful death statute solely by looking to other Probate Code pro-
visions, specifically to the definitions contained in the general defini-
75. Although the Milton court referred to non-Probate Code statutes which it felt
supported its position that the word "person" means one born alive, see id. at 255-56
(legislative support for the court's position found in ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§
1594-95 (1978) and Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2501-2961 (Supp. 1987)), its hold-
ing was fundamentally based on its interpretation of various provisions of the Code
and then harmonizing those provisions to the wrongful death act. Id. at 256. The
"integration of the wrongful death statute into the Probate Code strongly indicates
the Legislature's intent not to confer a legal personality on an unborn fetus." Id.
76. Id. at 255.
77. Ma REv. STAT. ANN. tit 18-A, § 1-201(29)(1981).
78. Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 538 A.2d at 255 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit 18-A, § 1-201(24)(1981)).
79. Id. (quoting Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-201(3)(1981)).
80. Id. (quoting Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-101 - 2-114 (Supp. 1987)).
81. Id. at 255. The Law Court cited an earlier case, Faucher v. City of Auburn,
465 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Me. 1983), for the proposition that the court should consider the
statutory scheme in its entirety when construing legislative intent as to a particular
provision of a comprehensive statute.
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tions section.8 2 In Pottle v. Central Maine Power Co.,83 Justice
Lipez granted the defendant's motion to dismiss a wrongful death
claim on behalf of a stepchild of the decedent, concluding that the
wrongful death act, by "its plain meaning," excluded stepchildren as
beneficiaries." After stating the traditional formula that the wrong-
ful death act is to be strictly construed, Justice Lipez looked to the
definition of "child" under section 1-201(3) of the Probate Code,
which excludes a person who is "only a stepchild." ' Although sec-
tion 1-201 provides that the general definitions apply "unless the
context otherwise requires," Justice Lipez held, on the basis of
Milton, that the court was constrained to interpret the word "child"
only by using the definition contained in the general definitions sec-
tion.86 Given the Milton court's interpretive approach, it is clear
that the Pottle justice had no option but to define the term by sim-
ply going to the Probate Code definitions.
In construing the wrongful death act in a manner which harmo-
nized the act with other provisions of the Maine Probate Code, the
Milton court admittedly utilized a traditional rule of statutory con-
struction whereby legislative intent with regard to a particular sec-
tion is gleaned from examination of the entire statute. This rule of
construction, however, was improperly applied to the death statute
by the Milton court. Usually, the rule is applied in cases where the
specific provision being interpreted directly and intimately relates to
the law covered by the comprehensive statute.87 The wrongful death
act, however, fundamentally concerns the establishment of liability,
*types of damage, and designation of beneficiaries in what is essen-
tially a tort action. The law of torts is "directed toward the compen-
sation of individuals ... for losses which they have suffered within
the scope of their legally recognized interests generally... where the
law consider[s] that compensation is required."8' In Milton and Pot-
82. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-201 (1981). This section also states that its
definitions are "[s]ubject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent Arti-
cles which are applicable to specific Articles or parts, and unles the context other-
wise requires ...."
83. No. CV-87-62 (Me. Super. Ct., Sag. Cty., June 5, 1989).
84. Id. at 4.
85. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 18-A, § 1-201(3) provides: "'child' includes any indi-
vidual entitled to take as a child under this Code by intestate succession ... and
excludes any person who is only a stepchild ...."
86. "Ascertaining the meaning of 'minor children' in this matter involves only ex-
amination of the wrongful death act and the definitions in the comprehensive statu-
tory scheme of the Probate Code." Pottle v. Central Maine Power Co., No. CV-87-62
(Me. Super. Ct., Sag. Cty., June 5, 1989), at 4 n.2 (emphasis supplied).
87. See, e.g., Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1122-24 (Me. 1983). in
which the Law Court harmonized various "tolling" provisions relating to statutes of
limitations in the Maine Tort Claims Act, Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 14, §§ 8101-8118
(1981).
88. PROSSER AND KEaTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5-6 (5th ed. 1984).
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tle, for example, the wrongful death actions sought to recover dam-
ages arising under alleged acts of medical malpractice and employer
negligence.89 Another important reason for the imposition of tort lia-
bility is to prevent or deter private behavior that is socially harm-
ful.90 The purpose of probate law, on the other hand, is simply to
transfer and distribute decedents' estates to heirs and successors 1
The fundamental nature of the wrongful death action as a tort most
likely accounts for the fact that the national model Uniform Probate
Code itself does not contain a wrongful death statute.02 It is odd,
therefore, that the Milton court would determine a question of tort
liability solely on the basis of a fetus's inability to inherit, rather
than looking to general tort law and other principles of law to in-
form its decision.93
The use of the Probate Code as the sole basis for interpreting the
wrongful death statute is inappropriate, moreover, because the legis-
lative history and the official comment in the Code itself indicate
that the wrongful death act has a different status within the Code
than the other provisions which relate solely to probate matters.
This special status, which the wrongful death act shares with other
sections of the Code, '94 combined with the substantial differences be-
tween a tort-based statute and a probate-related code, argue against
the overwhelming emphasis placed by the Milton court on harmo-
nizing the act with the Code.
The Maine Uniform Probate Code was based upon recommenda-
tions made by the Maine Probate Law Revision Commission. These
recommendations, in turn, were based substantially on the model
Uniform Probate Code of the National Conference of Commission-
89. The law of domestic relations should also be an important source for inter-
preting the provisions of the act, since the class of beneficiaries under the statute
encompasses family members. For example, in Pottle v. Central Maine Power, Co.,
the superior court justice should have inquired into the legal duties and obligations
owed by a stepparent to a stepchild to determine whether a stepchild could be a
beneficiary under the death act. The closer a stepparent's duties resemble a legal
parent's, the greater the justification for equating a stepchild with "child" under the
death statute.
90. PROSSER & KFaON, supra note 88, at 25-26.
91. See, e.g., Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-102 (1981).
92. See supra note 72.
93. In fact, the Law Court has historically looked to analogous civil actions for
"principles of law" in death actions. State v. Grand Trunk Ry., 58 Me. 176, 182
(1870). See also Minott v. Cunningham & Sons, 413 A.2d 1325, 1331 (Me. 1980) (com-
parative negligence statute, ME REv. STAT. ANN. tit.14, § 156, applies to the death
statute). In Milton, the dissent was properly concerned with harmonizing the death
statute with tort law, rather than with probate law. "Unless the Court is prepared to
bar a claim for prenatal injury, we are now left with the result that prenatal injury is
actionable while prenatal death is not." Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 538 A.2d at
258 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
94. See infra note 98.
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ers on Uniform State Laws.05 The Revision Commission modified
the model Uniform Probate Code to better conform the Code to ex-
isting Maine probate law and to further particular policy concerns.0
A substantial number of the provisions, including the wrongful
death act, were added to the model code simply because the provi-
sions were contained in Title 18 of the Maine Revised Statutes, the
title which contained the previous statutory probate provisions.0
The Revision Commission explained that "some parts of the pro-
posed Maine Probate Code that do not appear in the [model] Uni-
form Probate Code are simply sections preserved from present
Maine law which are not covered by, and are not inconsistent with,
the uniform version."98
95. MAM'i PROBATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, REFORT TO THE LEGISLATURE AND SUM-
MARY OF THE COMMISSION'S STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING MAINE PRO-
BATE LAW 6 (Sept. 1978) [hereinafter PROBATE COMM'N REPORT].
96. Id. at 6-10.
97. How the wrongful death act found its way to old Title 18 is a rather long story
in itself. In 1895, the death statute was grouped-along with other actions for which
executors of estates were responsible (like the survival action, for example)-in the
Revised Statutes under chapter 87, "Actions by Executors and Administrators." In
the 1895 Revised Statutes, the individual chapters were not organized into titles. In
1903, the Revised Statutes were organized into titles for the first time. The wrongful
death act continued to be grouped under the chapter headed "Actions by Executors
and Administrators" and was placed under Title Nine, which itself was entitled "Civil
Rights and Remedies" (presently Title 14). R.S. 1903, ch. 89, §§ 8, 9 & 10. The death
statute remained in the "Civil Rights and Remedies" title until 1944, when the fate-
ful decision was made to place the death statute and the entire chapter on actions by
executors into Title 14, "Powers and Duties of Courts of Probate / Domestic Rela-
tions," chapter 152. From that time to the present, the wrongful death act, although a
tort action, has been surrounded by probate law.
The Legislature did not provide any specific statement on why this placement was
made. In a final report in 1944, the Joint Select Committee on the Revision stated
that-
An effort has been made in this revision to codify the public laws of the
state. All related matters, as far as expedient, have been brought together.
An effort has also been made to delete obsolete laws, to simplify antiquated
language and to rearrange sections in an orderly manner.
R.S. 1944 at iv.
The placement of the chapter on actions by executors within the probate title in
1944 is readily understandable as merely a means of gathering in one location stat-
utes relating to the administration of estates. There is no indication that the Legisla-
ture considered the substance of the wrongful death act as affected by its placement
in the probate title. The Law Court did not treat the act any differently after 1944
than before. The first time the court made a connection between the act and its prox-
imity to probate law occurred in Milton, 44 years after the revision.
98. PROBATE COM'N REPORT, supra note 95, at 8. In addition to the wrongful
death act, the survival of actions statute (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 18-A, § 3-817
(1981)), the damages limitations in tort actions against personal representatives stat-
ute (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 3-818 (1981)), and provisions governing bonds
(ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 7-401 - 7-406 (1981)), among others, were placed in
the Maine Probate Code for this reason. For a complete list of these provisions, see
PROBATE COMM'N REPORT at 8 n.3.
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The consultant to the Commission, Professor Merle Loper of the
University of Maine School of Law, had earlier recommended that
these provisions be included within the new Maine Probate Code. In
a memorandum to the Commission, Professor Loper explained:
"The alternative to this approach would be to leave those sections of
Title 18 not already covered in the Commission's proposed code in
Title 18. Most of Title 18 would be repealed, leaving those sections
... scattered throughout a graveyard of obsolete, repealed
sections." 99
It is likely that neither the Commission nor the Legislature con-
sidered that the placement of the wrongful death act and other
"remnant" Title 18 provisions in the Probate Code, without sub-
stantive change, would alter the operation or substance of those pro-
visions. The Commission, after all, was engaged in a complex, multi-
year effort to organize probate law into a comprehensive integrated
whole. It would have been natural, and entirely expected, that the
intellectual effort expended was focused solely on probate law and
not on the problem of dealing with remnant provisions which were
only tangentially related to probate law. In fact, the Legislature rec-
ognized the special character of the remnant Title 18 provisions in
the official comment attached to each of these sections. For example,
following the wrongful death act, the comment reads:
General. This section was added to the Uniform Probate Code
version in order to preserve and integrate prior Maine law con-
cerning wrongful death actions.100
The Milton court's reference to the "explicit integration" of the
death statute into the Probate Code very likely stems from this
comment. The comment, however, does not state that the statute
was added to integrate the statute with the Code; it only says that
the statute was placed in the Code to preserve and integrate the
prior Maine law of wrongful death. In enacting the new Code, the
Legislature at the same time repealed former Title 18. The death
statute, therefore, had to be placed somewhere, and the most con-
venient location was the Probate Code. It is in that sense that the
death statute was preserved in the Code. And by combining three
previous Title 18 provisions relating to wrongful death into one new
section in Title 18-A, prior Maine law was integrated.1 1 The com-
ment says no more than that.
Assuming, however, that the Legislature did intend to integrate
the death act into the Probate Code, the Code expressly requires
99. Memorandum from Professor Merle Loper to the Maine Probate Law Revi-
sion Comm'n, August 1, 1978, at 2.
100. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (1981) (emphasis supplied).
101. See M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2551, 2552 & 2553 (1964).
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that its provisions be "liberally construed."'' 2 The Milton court,
nonetheless, strictly interpreted the wrongful death statute. 03 A lib-
eral construction of the provisions of the Code would have required
the Milton court and Justice Lipez in Pottle to engage in a substan-
tially different interpretive approach. Not only would a liberal con-
struction require a court to focus on the remedial purposes of the
wrongful death act, but also a court could look beyond the defini-
tions contained in the Probate Code. The language in the general
definitions section of the Code regarding application of those defini-
tions "unless the context otherwise requires" contemplates, given
the different area of law covered by the wrongful death act, that the
general Probate Code definitions should not apply in the context of
tort liability.
In conclusion, the wrongful death act was placed in the Probate
Code primarily for reasons of convenience. If the statute had not
been in former Title 18 in 1979, it is highly doubtful that either the
Revision Commission or the Legislature would have sought out the
act for inclusion into the Code. That the act itself is an anomaly
within a probate code is evidenced by the fact that the national
"model" Uniform Probate Code does not contain a wrongful death
act. Neither the legislative history of the Code, the official comment
to the wrongful death act, nor the Law Court's prior interpretation
of the death statute compelled the court to interpret the act solely
by harmonizing its terms with the law of intestate succession.
The better approach to interpreting the wrongful death act is to
recognize that the act is fundamentally different from the probate-
related provisions of the Uniform Probate Code. Therefore, its inter-
pretation should be based on the underlying purposes and policies
of the act itself, tort law, domestic relations law, and other related
law, including probate law, rather than by looking solely to the Pro-
bate Code.
B. Contemporary Common Law Principles Support Recouery for
Wrongful Death
The Law Court's rule of law that death actions may be brought
only as allowed under the death statute and its rule of strict con-
struction of the statute are both predicated on the Law Court's view,
first announced in Nickerson v. Harriman,104 that the common law
does not allow recovery for wrongful death. This view of the law,
102. M& v. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-102(a) (1981).
103. Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 538 A.2d at 254 ("both [sections] of the act
are to be construed together and as they create a liability unknown to the common
law, their effect is to be limited to cases clearly within the terms of the act") (quoting
Hammond v. Lewiston, Augusta and Waterville St. Ry., 106 Me. 209, 212-13, 76 A.
672, 672 (1909)). See also Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1020 (Me. 1988).
104. 38 Me. 277, 279-80 (1854). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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however, was incorrect in the 1850's and it is incorrect today.
As previously discussed, Baker v. Bolton was the first English case
to state categorically that the common law did not provide an action
for wrongful death.20 5 Prior to Baker, the right to such an action was
never specifically allowed or denied.106 Commentators and jurists,
however, have convincingly argued that the common law did, in fact,
allow such recovery.107 In American legal history, actions for wrong-
ful death were allowed under the "common law" prior to 1808. Dur-
ing the seventeenth century it was common practice for Massachu-
setts courts to order both fines and compensation to the surviving
family in cases of "manslaughter," "accidental discharge of weap-
ons," or killing through "chance medley."108 These cases awarded
compensation to surviving family members as an incident to a crimi-
nal proceeding. There was, however, at least one civil case which
awarded compensation for wrongful death in Massachusetts in the
colonial era.109 In a review of colonial cases, one legal historian con-
cludes that no "colonial statutes or decisions lend any support to a
belief that a death claim would have been denied by our colonial
ancestors."' 10 In fact, at least three American courts"' recognized a
common law action for wrongful death prior to 1848 when the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the rule of Baker v.
Bolton."2
There were no general common law principles or doctrines, more-
105. See supra Section I(A).
106. In Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607), a husband was
denied recovery in an action arising out of the assault and subsequent death of his
wife. It is unclear, however, if the denial was based on the common law maxim that a
personal action does not survive the death of the person (actio personalis moritur
cum persona) or because a wrongful death action was not recognized. Malone, supra
note 26, at 1054.
107. See, e.g., Malone, supra note 26, at 1052; Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule
in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431, 436 (1916); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375, 381-84 (1970) (Harlan, J.); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222
(1972). The author is unaware of any scholar who argues that the rule of Baker v.
Bolton was correctly based on the English common law of 1808 or the American com-
mon law of the mid-nineteenth century. See Malone, supra note 26, at 1052-53 for an
analysis of how English common law before 1808 would have supported a death
action.
108. Malone, supra note 26, at 1063 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSiST-
ANTS OF THE COLONY OF THE MASSACHUSrrs BAY 1630-1692, at 56 (1901)).
109. In 1669, Matthias Button sued John Godfrey "for firing his chimney which
caused his house to burn and the goods therein, also the death of his wife .... " 4
RECORDS AND FILES OF THE QUARTERLY COURTS OF ESSEX COUNTY 1667-1671, 130-31
(1914) (cited in Malone, supra note 26, at 1065).
110. Malone, supra note 26, at 1065-66.
111. See Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11234) (D.Me. 1825), dismissed
on appeal for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11233) (C.C.D.Me.
1827); Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 1 Am. Dec. 61 (Conn. 1794); Ford v. Monroe, 20
Wend. 210 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1838).
112. Carey v. Berkshire R.R. Co., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848).
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over, in either America or England, which supported the rule of
Baker v. Bolton at the time of its adoption. In 1970, Justice Harlan,
writing for a unanimous court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,1
undertook a broad reexamination of the rule of Baker v. Bolton. He
first noted the fundamental jurisprudential problem with the rule:
One would expect, upon an inquiry into the sources of the com-
mon-law rule, to find a clear and compelling justification for what
seems a striking departure from the result dictated by elementary
principles in the law of remedies. Where existing law imposes a pri-
mary duty, violations of which are compensable if they cause in-
jury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a violation
should be nonactionable simply because it was serious enough to
cause death.1"
Justice Harlan then stated that "[o]ne expects, therefore, to find a
persuasive, independent justification for this apparent legal anom-
aly." 5 In tracing legal history to discover a justification, Justice
Harlan dismissed the strongest legal rationale offered historically for
the rule116 and concluded that the only reason for its adoption in
America was that it had the "blessing of age." 1117 Another explana-
tion for the acceptance of the rule of Baker v. Bolton during the
nineteenth century was that it expressed, in shorthand fashion, the
courts' view that the enactment of the limited death acts prior to
Lord Campbell's Act took the field of wrongful death law out of the
purview of the common law. In other words, the death acts pre-
empted the development of the law of wrongful death through the
common law process.118
113. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
114. Id. at 381.
115. Id. at 382.
116. Justice Harlan noted that legal historians had concluded that the sole sub-
stantial basis for the rule was a feature of early English law, the felony-merger doc-
trine; a doctrine that had not survived into the nineteenth century even in England.
Id. at 382 (citing POLLACK, LAW OF ToRnS 52-54 (London ed. 1951) and Holdsworth,
The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 LQ. Rav. 431 (1916)). The felony-
merger doctrine stood for the principle that the common law did not allow civil recov-
ery for an act which constituted both a tort and a felony. The tort was treated as less
important than an offense against the Crown and therefore merged into or was pre-
empted by the felony. Id. at 382. See also Malone, supra note 26, at 1055-58. Justice
Harlan, however, noted that felony punishment never included forfeiture of property
in this country, and therefore the only plausible legal justification for the rule in
Baker v. Bolton had never even existed in the United States. Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 384.
117. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 386.
118. Professor Malone, in The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STA. L R'v. 1043
(1965), argues that the adoption of the rule by the first American law court, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, can best be explained by the already available,
but limited, statutory relief for persons killed on Massachusetts railways. Profesor
Malone, in his discussion of Carey v. Berkshire R.R. Co., 55 Mass (1 Cush.) 475
(1848), reasons:
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Whether one accepts the view that the rule of Baker v. Bolton was
adopted by the courts because of a respect for ancient doctrine or
because it effectively served to remove the courts' common law juris-
diction from the field of wrongful death, the allowance of recovery
for wrongful death under the historic common law, especially in
America, cannot be denied. In short, the rule in Baker v. Bolton
simply had no basis in either American legal history or jurispru-
dence at the time the rule was adopted by the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court in 1848 and subsequently by the Maine Law
Court in 1854.
Even if the Law Court refuses to accept this modern understand-
ing of the historic common law, contemporary legal principles in
Maine support a finding that common law now allows recovery for
wrongful death. Before addressing that issue, it is instructive to re-
view the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, which led to the holding that modern general mari-
time principles of law support the creation of a right to recover for
wrongful death. The Court noted that since its adoption of the rule
of Baker v. Bolton in The Harrisburg11 there had been a
development of major significance ... making clear that the rule
against recovery for wrongful death is sharply out of keeping with
the policies of modem American maritime law. This development
is the wholesale abandonment of the rule [of Baker v. Bolton] in
most of the areas where it once held sway, quite evidently
prompted by the same sense of the rule's injustice that generated
so much criticism of its original promulgation.1 2 0
Although the Court found some rejection of the rule in judicial
decisions, 2 it specifically noted that England had adopted a wrong-
The position adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
(and by the courts that eagerly followed it) can be readily explained in
terms of the practical situation with which the court was faced when it
made its decision: The Massachusetts Legislature had already preempted
the field of death claims, and the court was obliged to make a practical
adjustment in the face of this reality. The question to be answered was not
whether the wrongful death of a human being should be ignored by govern-
ment, but rather whether the court should admit the prospect of recogniz-
ing and administering conflicting remedies. This, as we shall see, was the
dilemma that was to be faced by virtually every American court confronted
with the problem of wrongful death from Carey onward.
Malone, supra, at 1069. Professor Malone further argues that the English appellate
courts also adopted the rule of Baker v. Bolton for this reason. Id. at 1059.
In 1848, the Maine Legislature passed a statute similar to the Massachusetts act
allowing relief for persons killed on railways. P.L. 1848, ch. 70, § 2. Thus the Maine
Law Court faced the same dilemma as the Massachusetts court when it adopted the
rule of Baker v. Bolton in Nickerson v. Harriman, 38 Me. 277 (1854).
119. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
120. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 388.
121. Id.
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ful death act in 1846 (Lord Campbell's Act), that every American
state had enacted wrongful death statutes, and that Congress had
created actions for wrongful death in various contexts. 122 Justice
Harlan then stated that:
These numerous and broadly applicable statutes, taken as a whole,
make it clear that there is no present public policy against allowing
recovery for wrongful death. The statutes evidence a wide rejection
by the legislatures of whatever justifications may once have existed
for a general refusal to allow such recovery. This legislative estab-
lishment of policy carries significance beyond the particular scope
of each of the statutes involved. The policy thus established has
become itself a part of our law, to be given its appropriate weight
not only in matters of statutory construction but also in those of
decisional law.'23
In addition to the statutory enactments, the Court was influenced
by an elementary principle of justice: "Where existing law imposes a
primary duty, violations of which are compensable if they cause in-
jury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a violation
should be nonactionable simply because it was serious enough to
cause death.'124
The Supreme Court's decision in Moragne was, of course, not
binding upon the states. However, a number of state courts have re-
examined the foundations of their wrongful death statutes by using
the reasoning and conclusions of the Moragne court. 2 The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court, appropriately enough, given its
early role in spreading the rule of Baker v. Bolton in the nineteenth
century, was the first state court to utilize the Moragne rationale
this way. In Gaudette v. Webb, 12 the Massachusetts court held that
the general statute of limitations applied for purposes of tolling the
running of the statute for a decedent's minor children under the
state's wrongful death act, rather than the specific limitation provi-
sions contained in the act itself. 27 The Gaudette court relied exten-
122. Id. at 389-90. Congressional enactments include wrongful death actions for
railroad workers, Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1908); for
merchant seamen, Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688; and for persons on the high seas, Death
on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762 (1920).
123. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 390-91 (citing Landis, Statutes
and the Sour~es of Law, HARVARD LEGAL EssAYs 213, 226-27 (1934)). Justice Harlan
also quoted from Roscoe Pound: "Today we should be thinking of the death statutes
as part of the general law." Id. at 391-92 (quoting Pound, Comment on State Death
Statutes - Application to Death in Admiralty, 13 NACCA LJ. 162, 189 (1954)). See
also Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CAT. UL RE%" 401
(1968).
124. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 390-91.
125. See S. Spmm, supra note 25, § L6, for a brief discussion on the possible
uses of Moragne by state courts.
126. 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972).
127. Id. at 71, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
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sively on the Moragne decision, finding that "the law in this Com-
monwealth has also evolved to the point where it may now be held
that the right to recovery for wrongful death is of common law ori-
gin, and we so hold. 128
Contemporary principles of Maine law require the Maine Law
Court to follow the general reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in Moragne and find that an action for wrongful death is sup-
ported by the contemporary common law in Maine.
129
128. Id. See also Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916
(1975) (fetus that is viable at the time of injury is a person under the wrongful death
act) (overruling Leccese v. McDonough, 361 Mass. 64, 279 N.E.2d 339 (1972)). The
court later clarified its holding in Gaudette by ruling that, although the wrongful
death action was currently grounded in the common law, the death statute continued
to be the sole source of procedures and remedies for wrongful death. See Hallett v.
Town of Wrentham, 398 Mass. 5 0, 556, 499 N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (1986) (independent
common law claim on behalf of minor children not allowed). Most recently, despite
the common law origins of the wrongful death action, the court refused to adopt a
discovery rule to extend the statute of limitations beyond the "unambiguous" terms
of the act. Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 402 Mass. 112, 116, 521 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1988)
("Here it is of no significance that the wrongful death claim has common law origins,
since we are first concerned with the meaning [of the death statute] which limits the
right to bring such claims. Only if the statute is ambiguous, or couched in terms that
suggest that we do so, do we look beyond the express statutory language.") This deci-
sion was vigorously disputed by Justice Liacos, now Chief Justice, in dissent. Id. dt
120-24, 521 N.E.2d at 733-35.
A number of state courts have adopted the Moragne reasoning to conclude that
state wrongful death actions have their origins in the common law. This conclusion
has had varying effects upon the interpretation and application of wrongful death
statutes. See, e.g., Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter Int'l, 694 P.2d 143, 145 (Alaska 1984)
(discovery rule allowed for wrongful death action, rejecting as "formalistic legal ab-
straction" the doctrine that statute bars right of action and remedy) (quoting
Haakanson v. Wakefield, 600 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Alaska 1979)); Summerfield v. Supe-
rior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 473, 698 P.2d 712, 718 (1985) (wrongful death statute and
precedent have combined to produce a cause of action with common law attributes);
O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Mo. 1983) (death statutes "mend the fabric
of the common law" and incorporate common law principles).
Not all states that have considered the Moragne rationale have adopted it, how-
ever. See, e.g., Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 P.2d 348, 353-56 (Tex. 1990) (re-
jecting discovery rule for wrongful death actions and holding that wrongful death is
solely a statutory based action). But see id., at 357-67 (dissent of three justices).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 comment k (1979) (noting
trend to allow "ameliorating common law principles to apply" to wrongful death
actions).
129. Although Moragne engaged the Court in creating a general maritime cause of
action, the reasoning is the same as that used by common law courts to develop rules
of law. Specifically, the Maine Law Court has used legislative enactments as sources
for developing new common law rules in the manner advocated by Pound and Tray-
nor, see supra note 123, and used by the Moragne Court. See, e.g., Anderson v. Neal,
428 A.2d 1189, 1190-93 (Me. 1981) ("discovery rule" exception to six-year statute of
limitations for legal malpractice); Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 991 (Me. 1982)
("discovery rule" adopted for foreign object medical malpractice); McKellar v. Clark
Equip. Co., 472 A.2d 411, 413 n.3 (Me. 1984) (abrogation of common law rule of
spousal immunity).
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The Law Court should recognize that through legislative enact-
ments, the Maine Legislature has shown that there is no general
public policy against recovery for wrongful death. The death statute
itself is, of course, the primary expression of legislative policy in
favor of recovery for wrongful death. The Maine Workers' Compen-
sation Act, 30 a major legislative enactment in the field of personal
injury law, also specifically provides recovery for wrongful death.1'3
The universal adoption of wrongful death statutes by all American
states and the federal government, which so influenced the Moragne
court, should also be given substantial weight by the Law Court.1"2
Similarly, the better reasoned decisions in other jurisdictions 33 and
scholarly writings"" that have challenged the old rule against recov-
ery for wrongful death support adopting a new rule to allow recovery
under the common law. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's decision to recognize the common law sources of the wrong-
ful death action is especially significant in light of Maine's historic
ties to Massachusetts 5 and because Maine adopted the rule of
Baker v. Bolton in substantial part upon the authority of the Massa-
chusetts case of Carey v. Berkshire Railroad.
In addition, there are basic principles of Maine law that support
finding a contemporary common law basis for a wrongful death ac-
tion. Of primary importance is the elementary principle of justice
that motivated the Moragne Court-the principle that recovery
should be allowed where injury occurs as the result of a breach of a
primary duty."6 The Law Court has noted this "general rule" of the
common law in Maine. "Since the early days of the common law a
cause of action in tort has been recognized to exist when the negli-
gence of one person is the proximate cause of damage to another
person." 7
130. M&. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 39 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
131. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 58, 142, & 143 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
132. The Law Court has frequently looked to legislative activity in other jurisdic-
tions as guidance for developing common law rules. See, e.g., Myrick v. James, 444
A.2d 987, 996 n.9 (Me. 1982); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 635 (Me. 1979).
133. Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter, 694 P.2d 143 (Alaska 1984); Summerfield v. Su-
perior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass 60,
284, N.E.2d 222 (1972); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 1085, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985) (Zap-
pala, J., concurring).
134. See, e.g., Pound, Admiralty Law - Comments on Recent Important Admi-
ralty Cases, 13 NACCA LJ. 162, 189 (1954). See also R sTATg rr (SEconD) OF
TORTS § 925 comment k (1977): "[Tihe right of action can now be regarded as arising
under the common law... When recognized, this common law right has been uti-
lized to fill in unintended gaps in present statutes or to allow ameliorating common
law principles to apply."
135. See Davis v. Scavone, 149 Me. 189, 100 A.2d 425 (1953), for a discussion on
the importance of Massachusetts judicial decisions on Maine law.
136. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1970).
137. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 75 (1980).
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The Law Court applied this general principle in Black v.
Solmitz.138 In Black, the court overruled an earlier decision which
had adopted the rule of parental immunity from negligence suits
brought by minor children. 13 9 In its decision, the court noted that
since the rule was first adopted there had developed a
strong trend against across-the-board application of a rule of pa-
rental immunity in tort cases [which] reflects a growing recognition
that such a sweeping application results in excessive protection of
the interests favored by the rule in derogation of the general prin-
ciple that there should be no wrong without a remedy.14 0
This principle of justice must be accorded great weight in Maine
because it is embodied in article I, section 19 of the state's constitu-
tion: "Every person, for an injury inflicted on the person or the per-
son's reputation, property or immunities, shall have remedy by due
course of law.'
41
In recognizing a common law right to recover for wrongful death,
the Law Court would cure a nineteenth-century legal anomaly that
has persisted throughout most of the twentieth century - that a vio-
lation of a primary legal duty that causes injury is recoverable, but
one that causes death is not. Even if the court, after such recogni-
tion, were to determine that the wrongful death statute is the exclu-
sive means of recovery, the effect on the interpretation of the stat-
ute, as discussed below, would be significant.
C. From Strict to Fair Construction
Rather than applying a strict or liberal interpretation, the Law
Court should simply emulate the Minnesota Supreme Court by
adopting a neutral "fair interpretation" for all statutes, including
the wrongful death act: "[W]e do not permit ourselves, because it is
an innovation, so to limit a statute by construction as to defeat or
138. 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979).
139. Id. at 635 (overruling Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966)).
140. Id. (citing ME. CONST. art. I, § 19). The court detected the "strong trend" by
looking to recent decisions in other states and recently adopted language in the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979).
141. ME. CONsT. art. I, § 19 (amended 1988). See, Comment, Article I, Section 19
of the Maine Constitution: The Forgotten Mandate, 21 MAINE L. REV. 83 (1969),
cited in MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 73 n.2 (Me. 1980). The Law Court
relied on this constitutional provision in Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins., 387
A.2d 220 (Me. 1978), where the plaintiff brought suit against her workers' compensa-
tion insurance carrier and its agent for wrongfully terminating payments. Although
the workers' compensation statute generally establishes exclusive remedies for actions
between employees and employers (the court treated the carrier as the employer), the
court held that the plaintiff could maintain her action because article 1, § 19 required
it to conclude that "legislation should not be deemed to preclude an injured person
from having a remedy of his own for a recognized wrong in the absence of a clear
manifestation of intent to that effect." Id. at 223.
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even hinder its purpose. Our effort is rather to give any statute 'a
fair construction, with the purpose of its enactment in view, not nar-
rowed or restricted because it is a substitute for the discarded com-
mon law.' ",142 Although the Maine Law Court has not developed a
consistent approach to statutory construction,4 3 the court has inter-
preted statutes by looking to legislative purpose, and in particular to
the mischief sought to be remedied.14 ' For example, the court has
stated that:
The first task of a court when interpreting a statute is to ascertain
the real purpose of the legislation. Once this purpose is found, a
court should give effect to it, avoiding results that are absurd, in-
consistent, unreasonable or illogical, if the language of the statute
is fairly susceptible to such a construction. A court can even ignore
the literal meaning of phrases if that meaning thwarts the clear
legislative objective. '5
A rule of "fair construction" would best accord with the general
purposive interpretation of statutes employed by the court today
and would respect legislative enactments in a way that the rule of
strict construction does not. The rule of fair construction, moreover,
is most consistent with the method the Law Court has used to inter-
pret recently enacted legislation that has created new causes of ac-
tion. For example, the court has employed a fair interpretation of
the strict products liability statute enacted in 1973,140 despite the
fact that the statute establishes a cause of action in derogation of
the common law.14
If, in addition to adopting a rule of fair construction, the Law
Court accepts the argument that contemporary common law princi-
ples encompass a right of recovery for wrongful death, the act will
be given a broader application through the process of statutory in-
terpretation. Not only would the acceptance of this principle elimi-
nate the primary basis for employing the rule of strict construction,
but it would generally give the court greater confidence to extend
142. Teders v. Rothermal, 205 Minn. 470, 472, 286 N.W. 353, 354 (1939).
143. Comment, Statutory Construction, 30 MANE L. REv. 72 (1978).
144. See generally id. at 72-84. Although the Law Court occasionally employs the
language of "legislative intent,' see, e.g., Town of Arundel v. Swain, 374 A.2d 317, 319
(Me. 1977), it is clear that the ultimate approach is one looking to "legislative pur-
pose." See, e.g., McKellar v. Clark Equip. Co., 472 A.2d 411. 414 (Me. 1984).
145. State v. Niles, 585 A.2d 181, 182 (Me. 1990) (citations omitted). See also
Maine Merchants Ass'n v. Campbell, 287 A.2d 430, 435 (Me. 1972) ("IWhen it is
clear that the policy consideration which brought about the Legislature's action was
to remedy a problem by whatever practices the problem is created, we think the
Court is required to so construe the statute.").
146. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (1980).
147. See Bernier v. Raymark Indus., 516 A.2d 534; Austin v. Raybests.Manhat-
tan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984); Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 392 (Me.
1982).
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the coverage of the act in difficult cases.14s But no matter how
broadly one reads a statute, or creatively uses materials extrinsic to
the words of a statute to divine its meaning, the process of interpre-
tation may honestly reach only so far. Even those who would allow
the greatest semantic leeway to the courts recognize that the words
of a statute do delimit meaning.14 To go beyond the proper bounds
of interpretation, to engage in a "spurious interpretation"'150 so that
a particular case is forced within the terms of a statute, is not only
intellectually dishonest but may exceed the limits of constitutional
judicial lawmaking.15' Interpretation, then, may not be adequate to
meet the goal of unifying statutes, especially old statutes, with the
contemporary legal landscape. 52
D. Beyond Interpretation
Once a court determines through a process of honest interpreta-
tion that a particular factual situation does not fall within the cover-
age of a statute, however, its judicial duty is not over, nor are its
powers exhausted. 53 Because American courts possess both the au-
148. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 88.
150. Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 379 (1907) (spurious inter-
pretation is judicial lawmaking that masquerades as genuine interpretation). See gen-
erally R. DICKERSON. THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 13-28 (1975);
G. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 38-41.
151. Where a court restricts the application of a statute short of what an honest
interpretation would allow, "there would seem to be no constitutional basis for (this)
restrictive application unless the provision is wholly or partly unconstitutional." R.
DICKEaSON, supra note 150, at 200. Similar constitutional difficulties arise where a
court tries to broaden the application of a statute beyond the "semantic leeway" of
interpretation. Id. at 201.
It is not always clear whether a court is creating law through its common law mak-
ing powers or through the process of statutory interpretation. For example, in Ander-
son v. Neal, 428 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1981), the Law Court created an exception to the
general six-year statute of limitations period by establishing a discovery rule for legal
malpractice. Though it is not entirely clear, the exception appears to have been cre-
ated by common law making, rather than by statutory interpretation. Id. at 1192 ("In
order to align the common law of this state with the well-considered legislative policy
.... "). On the other hand, in Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987 (Me. 1982), the court
established the discovery rule for "foreign object" medical malpractice cases through
the process of statutory interpretation. Id. at 992-93 ("It is a legitimate judicial func-
tion to make law interstitially by giving meaning through judicial interpretation to
vague, indefinite or generic statutory terms . . . ."). Justice Dufresne, dissenting in
both cases, contended that the majority had engaged in "judicial legislation," not in a
process of interpretation. Id. at 1005; Anderson v. Neal, 428 A.2d at 1193.
152. G. CALABREsi, supra note 13, at 38. "Discretion to interpret broadly and func-
tionally entails restraint, if we are to remain honest. But restraint unfortunately de-
prives interpretation of the capacity to deal adequately with the problem of obsolete
laws." Id. "[H]onest interpretation does not permit all, or even most, out-of-date laws
to be brought into line." Id. at 88.
153. A realistic analysis of the judicial role in relation to statutes must medi-
[Vol. 43:449
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
thority to interpret and apply statutes and to create law through
common law processes and techniques, courts may create new rules
of law that extend general principles of law underlying a statute to
factual situations otherwise not covered by the terms of a statute.
This judicial law-making power is limited only by the legislature's
power to preempt a particular field of law' 0 and by the inherent
constraints of the judicial decisionmaking process itself. 5a
The creative function of the courts to apply statutory principles to
reach facts beyond the specific terms of a statute, once subsumed
under the doctrine of "equity of the statute,"' 0 had until recently
generally fallen into disfavor. In the modern period, however, the
United States Supreme Court0 7 and legal commentators'" have re-
ate between [the extremes of examining solely the words or the "judicial
gloss" placed on those words] by recognizing that a court has two different,
intimately related, and equally important responsibilities: (1) to read the
statute in its proper context to ascertain whether and how its meaning re-
lates to the controversy at hand (thus establishing the court's legislative
terms of reference), and (2) where the meaning of the statute as so ascer-
tained does not resolve the controversy, to apply, adjust, or create an ap-
propriate judicial rule to resolve it. No approach that focuses on one of
these functions to the neglect of the other can make sense out of what
courts have been or should be doing in relation to statutes.
R. DICKERSON, supra note 150, at 18.
Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court made this distinction in a con-
curring opinion in Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564,139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122
(1977) (wrongful death action cannot be based on death of viable fetus). After noting
that contemporary California common law would allow recovery under wrongful
death and that the wrongful death statute did not preclude a common law wrongful
death action, Justice Tobriner based his decision against allowing recovery for the
death of a stillborn fetus not on his interpretation of the act alone, but on policy
reasons that would preclude recovery under common law:
[S]ince this court decided to reject the asserted cause of action for the
wrongful death of a fetus--as I believe it should-it must rest that decision
on reasons of policy .... It cannot avoid those difficult policy choices by
limiting its vision to the terms of [the wrongful death statute) and ignoring
the evolving common law of today.
Id. at 586-87, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 112, 565 P.2d at 137.
154. R DiciKmsoN, supra note 150, at 201. See also Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d at
992 ("That which we may not do is to change such a rule or policy once the Legisla-
ture has specifically taken it out of the arena of the judicial prerogative, in which it
originally placed it, by a positive and definitive statutory pronouncement, legiti-
mately within its own prerogative, of a specific rule or policy.").
155. See G. CMALAREsI, supra note 13, at 99; F. COFFIN, THE WVys OF A JunGE 51-
63 (1980).
156. The doctrine of the "equity of the statute" included both the justification for
broad interpretation of the terms of the statute to include doubtful cases of coverage,
and the application of the principles announced in a statute to cases not falling
within the literal meaning of the statute. See R. DicaKRSON, supra note 150, at 213.
157. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
158. R. DiciKitsON, supra note 150, at 213; Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Com-
mon Law Orbits, 17 CATHL U. Rav. 401 (1968); Landis, Statutes and the Sources of
Law, HARvARD LEGAL EssAYs 213 (1934), reprinted in 2 HARv. J. ON LEMi. 7 (1965);
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introduced the doctrine as a tool for harmonizing particular statu-
tory and common law rules with broader general principles that
dominate the legal landscape.
The recognition that the contemporary common law supports re-
covery for wrongful death, therefore, raises the ultimate question of
whether the Maine Law Court should allow the common law to sup-
plement the provisions of the statute beyond the process of honest
interpretation so that the law of wrongful death can, to the greatest
extent possible, conform to modern developments in Maine law.' 0
Perhaps the most influential modern decision applying the doc-
trine of the "equity of the statute" is Moragne v. States Marine
Lines.6 0 In that case, the Court was confronted with the question
whether congressional maritime wrongful death acts preempted the
creation and application of a general maritime action.161
[T]he legislature may, in order to promote other, conflicting inter-
ests, prescribe with particularity the compass of the legislative aim,
erecting a strong inference that territories beyond the boundaries
so drawn are not to feel the impact of the new legislative dispensa-
tion. We must, therefore, analyze with care the congressional en-
actments that have abrogated the common-law in the maritime
field, to determine the impact of the fact that none applies in
terms to the situation of this case.' 62
The Court concluded that Congress had "given no affirmative indi-
cation of an intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for
wrongful death to persons in the situation of this petitioner." 16 3 The
Court then held that the plaintiff could bring suit in wrongful death
under the general maritime law."'
In Moragne, the Supreme Court did not determine the precise
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. R.v. 4 (1936).
159. See S. SPEISER, supra note 25, § 1.6 (recognition of common law death action
could result in allowance of action based on "otherwise unavailable" theories of liabil-
ity, expand the class of beneficiaries and possible elements of damage, eliminate caps
on total monetary damages, and lengthen or eliminate limitations periods).
160. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
161. "General maritime law" is that body of admiralty law developed by judicial
law-making; it is in contradistinction to statutory maritime law and is, therefore, a
precise analog to a state's "common law." In Moragne, the plaintiff's decedent, a
longshoreman, had died on a ship in Florida state waters, where no wrongful death
statute, federal or state, provided recovery. Under Florida law, a wrongful death ac-
tion could not be brought on the basis of the unseaworthiness of the vessel, a form of
strict liability. On the other hand, the decedent was not covered under the federal
Death on the High Seas Act [hereinafter DOHSA], which did include unseaworthi-
ness as a ground of liability, but which applied only to persons who died on the high
seas beyond state territorial waters. Id. at 398. The precise issue faced by the Court
was whether the plaintiff could bring suit under a nonstatutory general maritime ac-
tion based on unseaworthiness.
162. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 392-93.
163. Id. at 393.
164. Id. at 402, 409.
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content of the general maritime death action, such as the class of
beneficiaries, the limitations period, or elements of damage. The
Court simply stated that lower courts should look for guidance to
the provisions of related state and federal wrongful death acts.' 5
165. Id. at 405-408. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's development of the con-
tent of the general maritime wrongful death action has proved to be uninspired. In
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974). the Court faced the issue of
whether the plaintiff could recover damages for the nonpecuniary loss of society
under a general maritime claim for the wrongful death of her husband, a longshore-
man who had died in state territorial waters. The Court held that, because most state
wrongful death statutes allowed recovery for loss of society, the general maritime
wrongful death action would allow similar recovery, id. at 591, even though neither
related federal statute-the Jones Act or DOHSA-allowed recovery for nonpecu-
niary damages. Because the decedent had died in state territorial waters, no federal
statutes were directly implicated in Gaudet. The Court did not have to consider,
therefore, whether any federal statute precluded recovery for loss of society as an
element of damages under the general maritime wrongful death action.
The Court was later faced with this issue, however, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), where the decedents had died on the high seas, the
maritime domain covered by DOHSA. The plaintiffs, therefore, sought recovery in an
area where DOHSA was applicable and where the decedent was otherwise covered by
DOHSA. In Higginbotham, the Court implicitly recognized the plaintiffs right to
bring a general maritime action, id. at 625, but, unlike Gaudet, the Court refused to
allow damages for loss of society. The Court held that the specific provision of
DOHSA which did not allow damages for nonpecuniary losses was an explicit limita-
tion on the measure of damages available to the plaintiff under the general maritime
action. Id. The Court then made an untenable distinction between proper and im-
proper "supplementation" of DOHSA.
There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence
and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.
In the area covered by the statute, it would be no more appropriate to pre-
scribe a different measure of damages than to prescribe a different statute
of limitations, or a different class of beneficiaries.
Id.
This same "logic" was recently employed in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 111 S.Ct.
317 (1990), to deny the plaintiff recovery under the general maritime wrongful death
action for loss of society of a Jones Act seaman who died in state territorial waters.
The facts of Miles are foursquare with those in Goudet except that in Miles the
decedent was a seaman otherwise covered by the Jones Act, while in Gaudet the de-
cedent was a longshoreman not covered by either the Jones Act or DOHSA. The
Miles Court first held that the plaintiff could bring suit on the theory of unseaworthi-
ness under the general maritime cause of action, but then held the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover for loss of society because the Jones Act precluded this type of
recovery. Id. at 323-25.
Although the results in Higginbotham and Miles are defensible and correct because
they promote uniformity under the maritime law and give appropriate weight to the
primary expressions of public policy in the maritime field (the Jones Act and
DOHSA), the ultimate holdings and related dicta are not. In these decisions the
Court unwisely and unnecessarily narrowed the scope of the federal judicial power to
supplement the maritime law of wrongful death. The logic of Higginbotham and
Miles is simply no logic at alL There is no principled basis for the distinction between
supplementation that permits, in Miles, a general maritime death action for a "true
seaman" on the theory of unseaworthiness but does not permit importing from the
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The Maine Law Court should similarly find that the state's
wrongful death statute does not preclude the court from supple-
menting the statute through the common law process. The enact-
ment of the wrongful death statute by the Legislature, like the con-
gressional enactment of wrongful death statutes in the maritime
domain, was a response to prior court decisions that held the com-
mon law did not allow recovery for wrongful death. Rather than evi-
dencing a legislative desire to preempt the field of wrongful death,
general maritime law an element of damages. The distinction cannot rationally rest
on vague determinations regarding legislative "silence" versus "speaking directly," or
a statute "leaving an area open" versus an area "covered by a statute." Id. at 325. For
in the Jones Act, the Congress surely spoke as clearly on the basis of allowed liability,
i.e. negligence only, as it did on the element of damages. Yet the Miles court found
that a general maritime action based on unseaworthiness was not precluded by the
Jones Act, but nonpecuniary damages were. The only proper distinction for determin-
ing whether a court is preempted from using the common law to supplement a statute
is whether the legislative body intended, in the first instance, to preempt the particu-
lar field of law addressed by the entire statute. Once a court determines that thresh-
old question and decides it may use common law principles to supplement the stat-
ute, no individual provision of the statute should preclude the court's development of
the specific content of that action or rule, unless the provision specifically indicates
that it preempts the field. The related statutes, rather than being rendered meaning-
less, however, become the primary sources of law for guiding the further development
of the supplemental action.
In Moragne, Justice Harlan explained that some statutes may preclude further
judicial law making in a particular field, while others may not, and the first task of a
court was to make this determination.
The legislature does not, of course, merely enact general policies. By the
terms of a statute, it also indicates its conception of the sphere within
which the policy is to have effect. In many cases the scope of a statute may
reflect nothing more than the dimensions of the particular problem that
came to the attention of the legislature, inviting the conclusion that the
legislative policy is equally applicable to other situations in which the mis-
chief is identical. This conclusion is reinforced where there exists not one
enactment but a course of legislation dealing with a series of situations, and
where the generality of the underlying principle is attested by the legisla-
tion of other jurisdictions. ... On the other hand, the legislature may, in
order to promote other, conflicting interests, prescribe with particularity
the compass of the legislative aim, erecting a strong inference that territo-
ries beyond the boundaries so drawn are not to feel the impact of the new
legislative dispensation. We must, therefore, analyze with care the congres-
sional enactments that have abrogated the common-law rule in the mari-
time field, to determine the impact of the fact that none applies in terms to
the situation of this case.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 392-93 (1970). After determining that
no federal death statute precluded the court from creating a general maritime law
cause of action, Justice Harlan stated that the content of the cause of action would be
guided, not determined, by related federal statutes and state wrongful death acts,
and that substantial deference should be given to federal statutes, especially DOHSA.
Id. at 393, 408. The Miles and Higginbotham Courts erred, therefore, by finding that
the Jones Act precluded the court from supplementing the act on the issue of dam-
ages. The Gaudet Court, on the other hand, erred by not looking to DOHSA and
other federal maritime law as the primary sources of law.
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the statute and its subsequent amendments were merely designed to
curtail a harsh judicially created rule.100 The act does not explicitly
or implicitly suggest that the Legislature intended to preclude
courts from exercising their common law-making powers in the field
of wrongful death.1 6 7
Given the important common law-making power of the Maine
Law Court, and the constitutionally based right to relief for dam-
ages suffered from a private wrong,16 8 the court should recognize a
strong presumption against legislative preemption. In fact, the Law
Court has already required an explicit statement from the Legisla-
ture before a particular area of law will be deemed preempted by
statutory enactments.""' The Law Court should find that the histori-
cal context of the passage of the act and the absence of any positive
legislative expression to preempt the field of wrongful death law al-
low the court to exercise its judicial lawmaking powers to supple-
ment the law of wrongful death beyond the interpreted terms of the
statute. The nature of the death action as primarily a creature of
statute, however-and this cannot be overemphasized-emphati-
cally requires any supplementation to closely adhere to the frame-
work of the statutory action. Principles of judicial prudence and the
need to give due deference to legislative policy are particularly com-
pelling in those areas of law, such as wrongful death, that are pri-
marily governed by statutory law.
The Law Court should determine that the wrongful death statute
was not intended to preclude the further development of a supple-
166. Cf. Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1976), discussing the effect of
various statutory enactments which limited the broad common law rule of govern-
mental immunity: "[T]he true sense of the law of the enactment as a whole was solely
to curtail the judicial doctrine and to cut down the defense of governmental immu-
nity .... ." Id. at 1271 (quoting Blier v. Town of Fort Kent, 273 A.2d 732, 737 (Me.
1971)).
167. Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court stated the point well.
In enacting the wrongful death statute, our Legislature probably initially
conceived that it was creating a right of recovery unknown to the common
law. But from this premise alone, I am unable to divine an affirmative legis-
lative intent to preclude further judicial development. I find nothing in the
statute or its history which anticipates and forbids the evolution of recovery
for wrongful death into a universally recognized right of common law status
. Judicial expansion and refinement of legal concepts characterizes the com-
mon law-any legislative intent to foreclose such traditional judicial activity
should require positive expression.
Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 586, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 111, 565 P.2d 122, 136
(1977) (Tobriner, J., concurring).
168. See, e.g., Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Insur. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me.
1978).
169. See Anderson v. Neal, 428 A.2d 1189, 1191 (Me. 1982) ("We agree with the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that, absent explicit legislative direction, defi-
nition of the time of accrual of causes of action for professional malpractice remains a
judicial function."). See also Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987. 993 (Me. 1982).
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mental cause of action for wrongful death. The court, however,
should defer to the terms of the statute as the primary, but not ex-
clusive, source of law in the area of wrongful death. The objective of
the comiflon law-making function in the context of supplementing
the coverage or scope of a statute is to bring a particular area of the
law into conformity with other, newly developed principles of law.
Confining a cause of action to the terms of the most closely related
statute defeats the goal of harmonizing particular statutory rules
with the broader, ever-changing legal landscape. On the other hand,
developing a completely independent cause of action, divorced from
the primary statutory enactments, also defeats the fundamental ob-
jective of shaping common and statutory law into a coherent body of
law.
So that the court Supplements the death statute without creating
an entirely independent, and potentially inconsistent, common law
wrongful death action, the court should adopt the following guide-
lines. Judicial deference should be expressed by fully respecting the
terms of the statute as the primary framework of wrongful death law
in Maine, and by allowing supplementation of the statute only in
the most compelling situations, primarily where the lack of supple-
mentation would result in the complete denial of recovery. Judicial
deference should be further expressed by allowing supplementation
only in situations that are closely analogous (like cases being treated
alike) to the coverage afforded under the statute. Although the court
should be guided by common law rules and principles, by the law of
other jurisdictions, and by scholarly writings, the primary source of
law should be legal principles or rules announced by the Legislature
through statutory enactments that relate closely to the law of
wrongful death. Finally, the development of the supplemental cause
of action for wrongful death should not be developed "whole"
through the announcement of detailed rules, but gradually through
the incremental, "molecular" process of change typical of the com-
mon law.
CONCLUSION
On March 31, 1991, the Maine wrongful death act observed its
100th anniversary. As this Article has shown, prior to its enactment,
the Law Court, like all courts in America and England, considered
an action in wrongful death beyond the pale of the common law.
After its enactment, the Law Court, again in step with other juris-
dictions, employed a rule of strict construction to limit the scope of
the act. The court also refused to extend the statute beyond its spe-
cific terms because the statutory cause of action preempted the field
of wrongful death. More recently, the court has restricted the scope
of the statute by interpreting its terms by reference to the detailed
provisions of the Maine Uniform Probate Code. This Article has ar-
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gued that all these approaches inappropriately limit recovery under
the death action, and, as a result, prevent Maine courts from harmo-
nizing the law of wrongful death with the broader, more dynamic
legal landscape. If the court continues along the same path, the ef-
fect will be to distance the law of wrongful death from other closely
related fields of law, most notably the law of torts and the law of
domestic relations.
As the wrongful death statute enters its second century, the Law
Court should invigorate the statute by discarding the current three
approaches to its application and interpretation. Instead of the rule
of strict construction, the court should adopt a rule of "fair" con-
struction. Instead of a rigid reliance on the provisions of the Probate
Code, the court should look to all relevant fields of law, but espe-
cially to the law of torts and of domestic relations. Finally, instead
of viewing the death statute as a preemption of the law of wrongful
death, the court should use the common law to create a supplemen-
tal cause of action in those compelling cases where the "reasoning"
of the statute applies, but where its words do not reach.
In order to contrast the application of the current rules with the
method of analysis proposed by this Article, the following hypotheti-
cal is offered.
The Case of the Adult "Minor Child"
The death statute provides that minor children of the decedent
are the sole beneficiaries in those cases where there is no surviving
spouse. 170 Suppose a case, however, where a twenty-five-year-old
man with two siblings under the age of 18 was totally dependent on
the financial and personal (care-giving) support of his mother, the
decedent, a single parent. Further suppose that the adult child is
severely mentally disabled. After the personal representative brings
suit under the death statute on behalf of all three children as benefi-
ciaries, the defendant files a motion to drop the adult, mentally re-
tarded child from the suit because he is not a "minor" child. This
motion confronts the court with the issue of whether the adult child
should be considered a "minor child" under the death statute itself,
or if not, whether the child should be a beneficiary under a common
law supplemental action.
Under the current interpretive rules, the meaning of "minor
child" would be determined by reference to § 1-201(24) of the Maine
Uniform Probate Code which defines "minor" as "a person who is
under 18 years of age." Because of the requirement of strict con-
struction, there would be little semantic leeway to define the term
"minor child" beyond this explicit provision of the Code. It there-
fore appears unlikely that the adult child could be included within
the phrase "minor child." Moreover, the Law Court's current rule of
170. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804(b) (1981).
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confining wrongful death actions solely to the terms of the statute
would deny the adult mentally retarded child status as a beneficiary
under a supplemental common law action despite the fact that the
child was completely dependent upon, and was, therefore, substan-
tially damaged by the wrongful death of the decedent-parent.
The methods advocated by this Article would substantially change
the analysis of this hypothetical case, if not necessarily the ultimate
result. The court would first analyze whether the Legislature in-
tended, either explicitly or implicitly, to include within the class of
beneficiaries an adult, mentally disabled child who was totally de-
pendent, both financially and personally, on the decedent.
Legislative history offers no guidance on the legislative intent un-
derlying the use of the phrase "minor children" in the death stat-
ute.171 The Legislature may have intended to limit the primary ben-
eficiary class to those persons who were actually financially
dependent on the decedent. On the other hand, the Legislature may
have intended to limit the beneficiary class to those children to
whom the decedent had a legally enforceable obligation to provide
financial support. Finally, the Legislature may have intended to en-
compass those children who were financially dependent on the dece-
dent and to whom the decedent had a legal duty to financially
support.
To determine whether an adult mentally disabled child who was
financially dependent on the decedent should be included within the
meaning of "minor child," the court should look not to the Probate
Code, but to the law of domestic relations, specifically to the Uni-
form Civil Liability for Support Act. 72 Sections 442 and 443 of the
Act provide that every man and woman shall support their children
and spouse "when in need." "Child" is defined as "a son or daughter
under the age of 21 years and a son or daughter of whatever age
who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient
means."173 By the enactment of this statute the Legislature has de-
clared, as a matter of public policy, that every parent has a continu-
ing legal duty to financially support a disabled child even after the
child has reached the age of majority. The support statute provides
a significant policy-based rationale for a functional interpretation of
the term "minor child" in the death statute, an interpretation that
would necessarily include those adult children who are so disabled
as to be either completely or partially dependent on the decedent
parent.
171. In 1981, the Legislature amended the death statute by adding the qualifier
"minor" before "children" in § 2-804(b). No reasons for this change are stated in the
Legislative Record.
172. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 441-53 (1981 & Supp. 1990). P.L. 1955, ch.
328.
173. Id. § 441 (emphasis added).
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If no such legislative intent could be discovered or if, through the
process of interpretation, the court declined to place the disabled,
dependent child within a functional definition of minor child under
the death statute, the court would next inquire whether the facts
suggest that recovery in wrongful death under a supplemental com-
mon law death action would be consistent with public policies en-
dorsed by the Legislature and reflected in related bodies of law.
As has been shown, the adult mentally disabled child shares im-
portant characteristics with members of the primary class of benefi-
ciaries in the death statute (i.e., minor children and surviving
spouses). Not only is the adult child a member of the immediate
family of the decedent, but also that child had been financially de-
pendent on the decedent, who, in turn, had a legally enforceable ob-
ligation to support the child. In these respects, therefore, the adult
mentally disabled child is almost identical to the members of the
statutory beneficiary class.
In addition, provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act"7' sup-
port the existence of a broad-based legislative intent to protect de-
pendent persons. The definition of "dependency" under the Work-
ers' Compensation Act explicitly includes disabled adult children
who have been financially dependent on the decedent parent.' 0 By
not allowing a supplemental action to proceed in this hypothetical
case, the court would create an anomalous situation where the adult
disabled child of a decedent parent who died in a work-related acci-
dent could receive death benefits, while the adult disabled child of a
decedent killed in a non-work-related setting could not recover for
his loss.
No discernible public policy would be served by dismissing the
wrongful death action in this hypothetical case. Either by the pro-
cess of interpreting the statute, or through the use of a supplemen-
tal death action, the court could better promote existing public poli-
cies by allowing the adult disabled child to be a member of the
beneficiary class. Given the advantages of harmonizing the death
statute with the larger legal landscape, the Law Court should reform
its approach to the interpretation and application of the wrongful
death act by adopting the methods advocated by this Article.
174. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 58 (1989).
175. See Lavoie v. International Paper Co., 403 A. 2d 1186 (Me. 1979); Case of
DeMerritt, 128 Me. 299, 147 A. 210 (1929).
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